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THE RACIAL ELEMENT IN SOCIAL ASSIMILATION

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There are three historical stages in the evolution of organized society, the tribe, the state, and the nation. Corresponding with these stages are three principles of organization, kinship, authority, and citizenship. The order of these principles conforms in general to the Spencerian law of growth, for they represent a progressive change from simplicity to complexity and an increasing integration and heterogeneity. In the kinship period civilization is wholly genetic, in the ethnic period largely so. In these two periods social growth is in some degree analogous to the growth of animal species. Primitive contacts are confined largely to kindred. Now ideas of contact, as Crawley has so conclusively shown, are at the basis of all conceptions of human relations at every stage of culture. Contact is the single general test, as it is the most elementary form, of mutual relations.¹

In the kinship group a high degree of intensive association is generated through mere propinquity, while a corresponding avoidance of outside contacts prevents the growth of that sympathy between groups without which even the most elementary forms of co-operation are impossible. "To primitive thought a stranger is a potential foe."² Social standards being fixed wholly within the group itself, that which does not conform to these is regarded not only as alien but as immoral. Ethical dualism, the illuminating phrase for which sociologists are indebted to Professor Ross, exactly defines the conventional status of the individual with reference to his own group and with reference to outside groups. It is not true, however, that ethical dualism ceases with the end of the kinship period or even the ethnic period. In his social relations modern social-

¹ Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, 76, and *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, 141.

ized man is still largely influenced as to his choices and his contacts by special preference for the members of his own class, party, fraternal order, church, or country. The word foreigner or outlander still carries something of its original significance of disassociation and antipathy.

In the historical period race always connotes something more than an enlarged family group, for it represents a positive advance toward cultural unity.³ As Bauer puts it, race involves both a *Naturgemeinschaft* and a *Kulturgemeinschaft*.⁴ When a race has sufficiently emerged to become a recognized entity its members have already developed a consciousness of kind which, while retaining something of the narrow exclusiveness of the kinship period, is nevertheless increasingly dominated by cultural rather than physical forces. Gumpłowicz declares that "a race cannot now be at all thought of as a mere natural concept in the narrow sense of the word, but it is everywhere a historical concept; it is not a product of the bare natural process in the present meaning of that term, but is the product of a historical process, which nevertheless is also a natural process. A race is a unity developed in the course of history in and through social evolution."⁵

Every great historical race is therefore a composite of originally separate elements merged into a unity whose ruling characteristic is an increasing integration of culture rather than of blood. This process of merging (*Verschmelzung*) is believed by Gumpłowicz to constitute the very essence of world-history. "Throughout the whole history of man stretches a continuous process of amalgamation which, beginning with the smallest primitive synthetic groups and following a race-building law to us unknown, binds together and amalgamates small heterogeneous groups into ever larger unities, into peoples, races and

³ "It may be doubted whether any character can be named which is distinctive of a race and is constant. Savages, even within the limits of the same tribe, are not nearly so uniform in character as has been often asserted."—Darwin, *Descent of Man*, 174.

"Le fait race, capital à l'origine, va donc toujours perdant de son importance."—Renan, *Discourses et conférences*, 2d ed., 297.

⁴ *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, 20, 21.

⁵ *Der Rassenkampf*, 193. Both this and the following citation are from the first edition of *Der Rassenkampf*, Innsbruck, 1883.

nations, perpetually bringing them into conflict against other similarly constituted and amalgamated peoples, nations and races, and through this conflict into ever new fields of conquest and culture, which again consolidate and amalgamate the heterogeneous elements."⁶

Both Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer have undoubtedly exaggerated the importance of conflict in the process of socialization. The state of "absolute hostility" which Ratzenhofer thinks the prime characteristic of primitive periods must have been moderated, even in very early stages, by the need for some form of co-operation in economic interests.⁷

In the formation of races the same law holds as in the formation of animal species, that of multiplication by division. Races are progressively differentiated, and, during the early period of isolation, the differences constantly augment. But after race-contact begins, and especially after amalgamation commences, the original sharply accentuated types gradually dissolve. If amalgamation is unchecked there finally survive in any group only general resemblances or even only traditional ideas of physical homogeneity. Rigid ethnic unity has perhaps nowhere survived in the period of advanced culture. On the cultural side conflicting or uncongenial traits are, through the process of attrition and accommodation, blended into a common mass, and this mass will be more complex in scope than was the case in the period of isolation. In an advancing civilization there is room not only for an ever larger degree of variation but for a growing tolerance of variation, since the forces of social integration tend constantly to work over more and more into the field of psychic sympathy. The fiction of blood-kinship, long retained with jealous care, shades gradually into loyalty to a common sovereign and ultimately into devotion to a common cultural system. Ethnic association thus merges into sympathetic likeness, and the race becomes the nation.

⁶ *Der Rassenkampf*, 254.

⁷ To counterbalance the extreme views of those who apply an exaggerated interpretation of the Darwinian principle of struggle to social evolution Prince Kropotkin has worked out many interesting proofs of early co-operation. See his *Mutual Aid a Factor of Evolution*, especially chap. iii.

In the larger field of loose conquest and subjection of heterogeneous peoples, such as is found in the case of the oriental dynastic empires or Rome, there is little tendency toward ethnic amalgamation. Chamberlain speaks of the "raceless chaos" within the Roman empire. The Roman world-state took little account of the ethnic character of its elements. Chamberlain also finds that the influence of the Roman Catholic church has been in the direction of race fusion, because it has kept before men's minds the ideal of a brotherhood of universal humanity as the kingdom of God in which all races are equal. In so far as this has tended to destroy "the sanctity of pure race" it seems to him a misfortune, for he contends that "race possesses not alone a physical-psychic but also a moral significance."⁸

The emergence of separate dynastic states at the end of the Roman period did not immediately place political union on a racial basis, but by making the units smaller it lessened the danger of universal fusion. The period of the French Revolution may be assigned as the time when racial unity was first exalted into a state-making principle. In the first half of the nineteenth century the concept of race, now merging into that of nation, becomes the dominant militant agent of political unity. It is not difficult to prove the existence of the nationality principle in the eighteenth century; witness the incipient rebellions that greeted the attempt of Joseph II to Germanize all the Hapsburg lands. But it was not until the specious promises of Napoleon had vitalized the latent self-consciousness of the peoples that the easy-going transfer of blocks of population from one state to another by diplomats began to be clearly regarded as an outrage on fundamental rights. The Restoration of 1815, by reverting to the old system, seemed to put a check on the nationalist movement but it really only augmented it by driving the new aspirations deep into the consciousness of the European peoples. No principle was so popular in the period immediately before 1848 as the right of each nation to

⁸ Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, I, 350, 367; II, 793 ff. Mr. Bryce points out that the Spaniards and Portuguese have fused with the indigenous races of their colonies more successfully than have the Protestant Teutonic nations (*Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind*, 42).

form a state, but the nation was still conceived to be an ethnic group which had become conscious of its cultural unity.

So gradual is the transition from one social stage to another that it is difficult to note the exact line of demarkation between the ethnic and national periods. It is easier to point out the steps in the whole process of change from the beginning than to distinguish chronologically their particular limits. Thus we know that initial hostility was succeeded by toleration, toleration by formal co-operation, this by sympathetic co-operation, and that the final stage is complete fusion. The nationalizing process is complete when the things of the spirit are held in common and cherished by all, even if some specific ethnic or linguistic differences survive.

From the point of view of its ethnic composition a nation may arise in three ways: (1) It may be composed of an unmixed stock; (2) It may spring from a fairly equal blending of two or more races which produces a mixed stock; (3) It may arise from a political union of two or more racial masses without blood intermixture. Generally, of course, the beginning of the process is conquest and subjugation, a process which Ward has called compound assimilation as contrasted with pacific assimilation resulting from volitional union.

Vico defines a nation as "a natural society of men who, by unity of territory, of origin, of customs and of language, are drawn into a community of life and of social conscience." Recent Italian sociologists have also included community of habitat, origin, language, and religion as necessary factors in nation-making. But in nearly every example among well-defined modern national groups one or more of these elements is wanting. It is desirable then to discover a simple characteristic which is not only inclusive but universal in application. Maurice Block denies the necessity of insisting on any of these objective elements and says:

"The nation, therefore, is not a physical body or unity, but a moral body; it is not always determined by external facts nor by them alone, but by sentiment."⁹

⁹ Lalor, *Cyclopaedia*, II, 931 ff. Burgess, in a definition often quoted, calls a nation "a population of an ethnic unity inhabiting a territory of a geographical unity." Burgess evidently has in mind a purely political nation (*Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, I, 1).

Similarly Renan:

A nation is a spiritual principle resulting from the profound complications of history; a spiritual family, not a group determined by the configuration of the soil. . . . Two things, which in truth make only one, constitute that spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present; one is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the actual consent, the desire of living together, the disposition to continue to give value to the undivided inheritance they have received. . . . To have a common glory in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to desire to do still more: these are essential conditions for being a people.¹⁰

Similar in content, but less rhetorically expressed, is J. S. Mill's assertion that the most potent factor in creating a nation is "identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past."¹¹

Briefly defined, then, nationality is a thing of sentiment growing out of community of past experience and present cultural interests. It is not sufficient that peoples should merely have undergone similar experiences. They must have undergone them together. Most of the great modern nations have passed through the same processes of social change, but in actual adjustment to such change each has had its own separate career. The solidarity of Protestant and of Catholic interests in the religious struggles of the Reformation and post-Reformation periods did indeed for a time seem to transcend national lines, but this common interest was soon lost in the narrower range of particular state interests.

The essence of national sentiment is found in patriotism. The term usually connotes devotion to a political state, but racial patriotism, while less definite, has been a notable factor

¹⁰ Lalor, *Cyclopaedia*, II, 923 ff. Auerbach likewise insists on the subjective view of national sentiment. It "has its roots and its *raison d'être* not in a combination of these (material) factors, but in the conscience and the will of men who group themselves under its standard, if these men, whatever their origin, language, or religion, live the same life, have the same institutions, respect the same traditions, and aspire to the same ideal."—*Les races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie*, 18.

¹¹ *Representative Government*, 308.

in recent history.¹² It is to racial patriotism that the appeal has been made in the crusades for Pangermanism and Pan-slavism. As a patriot man transfers the stress of his loyalty from individuals to the group itself as an idealized personality. Patriotism can exist only when the group has become a separate entity capable of definite differentiation in thought and associated with clearly marked interests. It is weak where social unity is weak. Dr. Johnson's characterization of patriotism as the last refuge of a scoundrel was not inappropriate for the eighteenth century, nor was Comte's relegation of patriotism to the theological stage of social evolution unnatural in view of his large ideas of the future of humanity. Bagehot's definition of patriotism as territorial sectarianism, on the other hand, confines the meaning of the term to geographical boundaries that are too narrow for present ideas of group loyalty.¹³

But the very possibility of higher patriotic sentiment is evidence that the transition from the genetic interests of the ethnic period to the profounder sympathies and choices of the culture-group period has already occurred. "Whatever its faults," says Ward, "it marks the disappearance of the last vestige of the initial social dualism. It means the end of the prolonged race struggle."¹⁴ Although most of the great national movements of the nineteenth century were theoretically based on the rights of race, the real working principle was not racial but national. Even before the discoveries of modern ethnology it was known that not all of the European peoples were of unmixed stock. It is now established that there exists very little genuine racial unity in any single people, and the greater divisions like the

¹² It is possible to show that there is in recent times even a color patriotism, leading to a setting off of interests between the white and colored races. This is the thesis of Weale's *Conflict of Color*, London, 1910. A German traveler in East Africa reports that he found, soon after the Russo-Japanese war, that a native chief had heard with elation that a colored race somewhere had beaten a white race in war (Weale, *Native Life in East Africa*, 125). In the early part of the Boer war news of British defeats spread with incredible rapidity among the natives throughout the whole of Africa.

¹³ The English word "fatherland" and the German *Vaterland* imply this material, geographical conception. The Latin *patria* (French, *patrie*) carries something more of the psychic significance of the group sense.

¹⁴ *Pure Sociology*, 212.

Teutonic and Slavic are found to be, at bottom, linguistic and cultural rather than physical unities.

Whereas racial qualities are by their nature more or less immobile, patriotic sentiment is easily transferable. Just as the modern processes of transportation have rendered easy a change of habitat, so the decline of ethnic interests has augmented the fluidity of psychic choices. This fluidity of volition has forced on our attention the principle of elective nationality, and has brought about a halting recognition of the plebiscite as a prerequisite to the transfer of a population. It has also raised the question whether, even when the principle of elective association is granted, any given generation has the right to fix for all time the affiliation of its successors. Untried experiences or new events may in the future alter the whole basis of choice. Corsica was hostile to French domination until the glory of Napoleon's career made her enthusiastically French. Alsace remained for a century of French rule an indifferent foreign district until pride in revolutionary heroes like Kellermann and Kleber carried the Alsatian heart over to the republic.

A change in national character or ideals will alter the attractive force of a nation and draw or repel according as different types of mind find congeniality or antipathy in the new character. German democrats were the most ardent patriots while hope survived of a liberal reorganization before 1848, but with the coming of reaction numerous Germans transferred not only their allegiance but their enthusiastic loyalty to democratic America.¹⁵ There is little doubt, also, that the dominant militarism of the present is driving out many Germans besides those who seek to escape military service.

A nation, in the sense before described, may and often does exist apart from the political state. The state necessitates geographical as well as political unity. Now when two or more uncongenial racial groups occupy the same district they cannot under existing conditions belong to different states, nor can scattered fragments of the same stock be united into a single

¹⁵ The recently published *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* threw a flood of light on the enthusiastic idealism of the German immigrants who sought a home in the United States after 1848.

body for common political action. The present racial muddles in Austria-Hungary arise from the fact that Germans and Slavs, Magyars and Slavs, Magyars and Wallachs, and different bodies of unassimilated Slavs are mingled in the same territorial divisions. Each group insists, if not on hegemony at least on autonomy in local administration. Mill is right in declaring that "free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities." "When the sentiment of nationality exists in any force," he continues, "there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart."¹⁶ The ethnological map of central Europe shows that the realization of this principle would involve a wholesale sorting-out and redistribution of the populations between the Baltic and the Adriatic.

Two fundamental rights pertain to a nation which has validated its separate existence: that of internal sovereignty and that of independence toward other nations. Bohemia is a good example of a modern political division where such rights are impossible of achievement because of racial heterogeneity. Germans and Czechs have each a well-developed sense of solidarity as well as antipathy, and yet they are inextricably mingled in many separate districts of Bohemia. So incongruous have the two elements become that members of the Young German party have refused to call themselves Austrians and have openly agitated for union with Germany, while the young Czechs have looked longingly toward Russia as the hope of the Slavic race.¹⁷ Local autonomy with universal suffrage would reduce the minority party to the position of a subject race. A dual government or a federal type of organization would be possible only if each group had an approximately separate territory.

As the process of assimilation to a new group was typified in the kinship period by the material fact of blood-transfusion or ceremonial adoption, so in the national stage the transformation is marked by a formal acceptance of certain new cultural elements, chief among which is usually reckoned language. The

¹⁶ *Representative Government*, 310.

¹⁷ *Annual Register* (1890), 53.

process has been named by Novicow denationalization. Now denationalization may be coercive or it may be voluntary. When the process is undertaken by governments in the interest of national uniformity it is usually coercive, and Novicow is of course right in declaring that such attempts in Europe have been not only bunglesome but generally unsuccessful. To attempt to compel a people to give up culture elements which have become intimately associated with its inner life is to enhance the value of those elements and to give them something of a religious sanctity.

First among the factors of denationalization, both as a test and as an instrument, is language. Several of the great ethnic groups speak different languages, and there are well-developed nations which are polyglot, yet the nationality movements of the mid-nineteenth century assumed that language was the criterion of both racial and national unity. Little heed was given to the historical process by which the language had been acquired, since present language is a definite fact more easily verified than even physical traits. The making of grammars has doubtless done much to promote ideas of unity. Freeman goes so far as to say that the doctrine of race itself is essentially a learned doctrine, the offspring of the scientific study of philology in recent times.¹⁹ But the revival or the coming to self-consciousness of a language often follows rather than precedes the arrival of the national group-sense, or, as Grasserie says, "when a people becomes conscious of itself it creates or rediscovers its language."²⁰

As a mere instrument of communication, as a carrier of common ideas, language is more important than dress or other expressions of formal like-mindedness, but it is not all-important. It is necessary of course that members of a society be able to communicate freely with one another, but if ideas themselves are already alike the most essential basis of social co-operation is present even if the instrument of expression be

¹⁸ *Les luttes entre les sociétés humaines*, 128, 152.

¹⁹ *Historical Essays*, 3d series, 196.

²⁰ Grasserie, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, XIII, 446.

not uniform. It is as a culture good that language takes rank as a potent factor in the psychic unity of a people. The possession of a language already vitalized by a great literature was a central fact in the national movements of Germany and Italy. Several of the lesser national movements were slower in gathering momentum because their languages had been for centuries neglected or discredited and had never had a great literature.

Hence for some of the newer nations the first problem has been the organization of expression. In 1823 there were no publications written wholly in the Magyar language and but four partially so, while in 1906 there were one thousand wholly in Magyar and five hundred partially so. The rapidity of Hungarian national development after the founding of the National Academy in 1825 and of the National Theater in 1834 is a matter of history.²² The Croatian national movement was very largely the outgrowth of an intellectual crusade, headed by Bishop Strossmayer, which resulted in the founding of the University of Agram, a Croatian academy of science and belles-lettres, and a national academy of music, all of which raised the Croatian language to the level of a culture speech which supplanted the ruling German.²³ Kollar, the Slavonian nationalist, proclaimed as his program in 1837 Slavic unity, not through political independence but through cultural unity, to be achieved by means of book depots, free libraries, the collection of popular songs, proverbs, and folk-lore, and through chairs of Slavic literature in the universities.²⁴

"It is safe to affirm that the social transformations which are brought about in a given territory in the direction of the leveling of all classes and localities by the introduction of locomotives as substitutes for wagons are as nothing compared with the same kind of social changes that are due to the overflow of one great dialect over several petty ones, of one language over several dialects. Linguistic similarity is the *sine qua non* of all other social similarities, and, consequently, of all those noble and glorious forms of human activity which presuppose the establishment of those similarities and which work on them as a canvas."—Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, 263-64.

²² Colquhoun, *The Whirlpool of Europe*, 136-42. All the important racial-national groups of Austria-Hungary have magazines as organs of the national movement. See Auerbach, as above cited, 5, note.

²³ Tissot, *Unknown Hungary*, I, 116.

²⁴ The influence of national heroes as a factor in vitalizing national sentiment is usually considered as pertaining to literature, but it may be and often is an entirely distinct agency.

These attempts to vitalize the social self-consciousness of groups depressed and disintegrated by political subjection have come from within the groups themselves. Over against them are to be placed the efforts of governments at coercive denationalization by imposing the language of a ruling race. The modern state demands administrative uniformity. Language is held to be the best means of standardizing populations, not only because of its use in official activities but because of its supposed power of breaking down the separatist tendencies of alien masses. Thus in Hungary the Magyars, since establishing their autonomy, have adopted a rigid policy of language unification which attempts to wipe out the Slovak and Roumanian tongues, and which has gone so far as to Magyarize the names of the Slovak towns and villages. The realization of the Hungarian state idea is held to be bound up with the obliteration of all vestiges of culture-difference in the populations of the country.

It is therefore no accident that the fiercest nationalist struggles have centered about the question of the official language to be used in the school, the army, and the courts. When Alsace was annexed the first task in the process of nationalization fell to the German schoolmaster, as has been the case in the American occupation of the Philippines. Prussia's poor success in Germanizing Posen is rightly attributed to the stubbornness of Polish children in refusing to learn and use German.²⁵ Russia's policy of leveling down all her heterogeneous and heterodox subjects in Poland and the Baltic provinces has likewise followed the lines of suppression of non-Russian speech in the schools and universities and the forced use of Russian in all official procedure.

In democratic societies unity of language has the additional advantage of furnishing a medium of public opinion without which the social will is impotent. An apparent exception to this principle is found in the case of those bilingual or trilingual states where the heterogeneous elements were originally and

²⁵ This and other aspects of the Polish national movement have been brilliantly set forth by Hans Delbrück in an article, "Das Polenthum," in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, LXXVI, 173 ff.

effectively equilibrated when the states were formed. If no linguistic controversies occur in Belgium or Switzerland it is because the Teutonic and Gallic divisions entered the union already compactly organized or at least with their position clearly recognized and guaranteed. This again was possible here, as contrasted with the districts farther east, because the racial and linguistic regions were and are clearly set off from one another. Quite in contrast stand the Ruthenians of Galicia, whose position with reference to the Poles is approximately that of a subject race and whose desire for annexation to Russia is openly expressed. Similarly the Wallachs of Transylvania find themselves overridden by the Magyars and desire to unite with their brethren of the kingdom of Roumania.

In the complex system of modern exchange and economic interdependence community of language is almost as important a factor as it is in cultural and administrative concerns. Commerce was always a breaker of barriers and a standardizer, but never so much so as now. Kossuth, in founding the society for the promotion of Hungarian manufactures in 1844 did more for the national cause than he could then realize, for Hungarian economic independence has forced upon business interests the necessity of using the national language. Economic interest cannot of itself develop a contagious national enthusiasm but it can break down the original barriers of particularism and leave the way clear for psychic forces to do the rest later. If in the present generation Germans and Jews in Hungary not only speak Magyar and Magyarize their names but are also the most ardent of patriots the reason may be found in the formal acquiescence of German and Jewish merchants in the demand for the universal use of the Magyar language that followed the Hungarian national exhibition of 1875.

Almost without exception the problems of racial assimilation in Europe are those arising from the contacts of considerable masses where antagonistic types compete within the same political area and where the ultimate issue is one of mastery or subjection. The massing²⁶ of populations in homogeneous

²⁶ Cf. Durkheim, "La densité dynamique," *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, 139.

social groups makes the enforcement of a change of cultural standards difficult, as did isolation in the primitive age. Social forms and forces acquire self-sufficiency through their own volume and inclusiveness. Massing keeps alive traditions, it gives continuity to fashions and habits, and it perpetuates a reputable set of orthodox ideals and choices into which each generation grows unconsciously during the plastic period of childhood. If protected by the "cake of custom" group types retain their characteristics as persistently as masses of physical matter retain moisture, color, or odor when unpenetrated by light and air. Scatter a thousand individuals of a certain type among a thousand villages and they will soon resemble their neighbors. Mass them in a single village and they remain largely unmodified in the essentials of personal and social character.

But when we turn from the static groups of Europe and Asia to the nascent social bodies of the United States, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand or Australia the situation is changed because the conditions of social accretion are different. In each of these cases the original settlers formed a fixed kernel which has pretty definitely shaped the later standards of social action through language, traditions, and social ideals. Whatever accretions of population have since come in have not come as large bodies with fixed characters but have filtered in as individuals or small bodies which, percolating through the original mass, have been swallowed up by it. Lacking the momentum of organic groups they have usually conformed easily to established standards. If immigrants into the United States have, to use a current phrase, been easily "absorbed," it has not been because there has existed here a physical stock with superior fusing power, but because the immigrant has found a set of social forms and ideals to which he has usually been glad to conform but which in his isolation he could hardly have resisted if he would.

One need only instance the Jew to prove this point. Every device known to human ingenuity has been employed in continental Europe to compel him to conform to dominant standards and he has only become more obstinately a Jew.

In America, with full liberty to retain cherished interests, so far as legal and administrative measures were concerned, Jewish separateness has immediately and rapidly disintegrated. Judaism has been dealt with in Europe as a racial fact, which it is not, while in America it has been treated as a civilization, which it is. So eager are the Jews to become Americanized that many of their people labor persistently from the start to efface all traces of their alien descent.

This is of course particularly true of the younger generation. Children are morbidly sensitive to that ridicule to which variation from the ruling fashion subjects them. To speak a strange tongue, to wear strange garb, is to expose oneself to contumely among one's mates. Children of a dominant type also retain something of primitive man's aversion to the unfamiliar, and they are as merciless as primitive man or as animals in buffeting an oddity. It is not unusual to find children of recent immigrants refusing to speak the language of their parents even in the home. The fact that migration to a new land has occurred suggests the inferiority of the old speech, customs, and values. To speak English and to wear American clothes is taken as a mark of belonging to the superior culture, since these things pertain to the ruling class. "When a people dominates others through its brilliancy," says Tarde, "others, who heretofore had imitated none but their forefathers, imitate it."²⁷ On the woman's side of life, also, conformity to type is promoted by the desire to get into "society" where the standards are likely to be even more rigorous than those of the general community. The process of accommodation in this case is almost invariably unilateral rather than reciprocal, for the purpose is to cover up or erase all traits not in harmony with the prevailing type.

This strong pull toward conformity, however, is not wholly due to ambition for economic or social advancement. It is in most cases the mark of real psychic assimilation to a type deliberately chosen and ardently admired. In the later years of life there may come a mild revival of affection for the ances-

²⁷ Tarde, *Laws of Imitation*, 368.

tral type but this is little likely to become a ruling motive. Ratzenhofer's prediction that there may come in America a revival of national groups when population shall have become more dense and the struggle for existence more keen will arouse little fear in those intimately acquainted with American social forces. Such a contingency might arise if American nationality were based wholly or chiefly on ethnic instead of cultural and social interests. It is conceivable that particular racial bodies may retain a shadowy existence, but they are not likely to acquire anything but a conventional form, nor is their active influence likely to extend beyond the first or second generation.

Because denationalization has been voluntary and because assimilation has been welcomed with a zeal born of eager desire for assimilation, there has hitherto been little need for governmental action in any of the newer countries looking to its regulation. This state of affairs will continue only so long as and to the extent that native standards continue to dominate the population. Any pronounced attempt at coercive assimilation would probably result, as it has resulted abroad, in arousing that sort of reaction which exalts the principle of the oppressed nationality into a sacred cause. Opposition is the only agency that can drive national sentiment into the very core of a people's heart, for, like religious enthusiasm, patriotism flourishes on persecution. Almost the only attempt of this nature in the United States, that of the school laws of Wisconsin and Illinois in 1889, showed clearly the unwisdom of coercion in a democratic community.²⁸ The use of coercive methods would destroy much of the spontaneous loyalty which now takes possession of the immigrant after a short residence in America.²⁹

This does not imply that society may safely assume a passive attitude toward assimilation. It is true that conditions in the United States have hitherto been such that little specific action was needed, for abundant land and a sparse population

²⁸ See an article by Mapel in the *Educational Review*, I, 52; also Vilas in the *Forum*, XII, 198.

²⁹ The enthusiasm for American ways shown by immigrants who have returned to Europe to reside after some years in America and their influence on their home communities has been graphically pictured by Mr. E. A. Steiner in his recent book, *On the Trail of the Immigrant*.

have made possible the process of percolation without special guidance. But with the coming of greater bodies of immigrants of markedly alien types and particularly with the growing aggregation of population in urban centers, the massing of unassimilated groups is not only possible but is already beginning. Thus in 1900 the proportion of foreign population in certain cities was most striking:

	Foreign Born	Of Foreign Parentage
New York.....	37 per cent	76.9 per cent
Chicago.....	34.6	77.4
Philadelphia.....	22.8	54.9
St. Louis.....	19.4	61
Boston.....	35.1	72.2
Baltimore.....	13.5	38.2
San Francisco.....	34.1	75.2
Cleveland.....	32.6	75.6
Detroit.....	33.8	77.5
Fall River.....	47.7	86.1
Duluth.....	39.6	79.8

The situation is not so serious in these cities as it is where unassimilated populations meet in the districts of central Europe, owing to the fact that in nearly all cases the alien elements are of many stocks instead of two. But, while no one racial group predominates, it is nevertheless true that within single groups there is a growing tendency toward a separate, self-sufficient life little affected by American social influences except as these are brought to bear on children in the schools.

Furthermore, while in 1880 forty-one per cent of all immigrants came from English-speaking countries, in 1909 only ten per cent came from such countries. The mere numbers, however, are not necessarily significant. Between 1880 and 1909, 17,142,280 immigrants arrived, but the proportion of foreign-born in the whole country did not perceptibly increase between 1880 and 1900.³⁰ The significant fact is that the newer immigrants, who are more remote from the American type than the Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians of the earlier period, are not so diffused that spontaneous assimilation will readily occur.

³⁰ 1880, 13.3 per cent; 1890, 14.7 per cent; 1900, 13.6 per cent.

In 1908, sixty-six per cent of those entering were destined for the five states of New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, the great majority, of course, to find a home in the "foreign colonies" of the larger cities. Governmental action is not called for to enforce assimilation or to dictate its methods, but rather to insure a proper environment for it, by preventing massing and by so adjusting distribution that assimilation will take care of itself.

In the world-contacts of independent racial groups the process of accommodation differs from that where two racial masses are struggling for the mastery within the same area and where the end sought is immediate absorption. Easy and rapid communication, along with the spread of education, is making over the peoples of the earth into a world-community. The adjustment among them is still far from complete, nor is co-operation sympathetic or harmonious. The volatile urban community, with its quick response to numerous and simultaneous stimuli, is coming to set the tone for all modern societies. Among groups as among individuals the subjective type of mind is becoming the characteristic one. Lamprecht designates the recent period as the age of nervousity. As the great races have become better acquainted with one another they have developed a certain degree of self-satisfaction and a corresponding touchiness. Doubtless the asperities of mere race animosity are already softening and are destined to still further soften, and if so it must be through the same process as that by which individuals are accommodated to each other, by common contact through a long period with a given set of cultural institutions. For if any one fact in recent world-history is clear it is that the institutions of civilization are being standardized. Tarde has said that civilization has gone around the world and come back again, so that its chief phases are no longer local but planetary. For individuals this may result in a sharper differentiation, but for societies the consequence will be gradual integration.

How far this process may lead no man can foresee. Ward believes that pacific assimilation, now that war is ceasing, will

ultimately bring about a blending of the separate races into a single generalized type or world-race.³¹ Assimilation of races, however, implies some elements not involved in the assimilation of cultures. The one denotes primary association, the other secondary. And since in primary association physical elements furnish the chief basis of attraction, these are likely to retain their old dominance long after a fair degree of cultural unity has been attained. The consciousness of physical kind, for one thing, is more elementary and primitive than cultural affinity, and its movements are slow for the same reason that the processes of natural selection are slow.

While, therefore, this century seems destined to be a period of internationalism and of a limited degree of cultural cosmopolitanism, just as the nineteenth century was the age of nationalism, there is no reason to believe that the races will be merged in a universal melting-pot.³² Both the ethnic and cultural differences between certain human groups are so great that general amalgamation is for the present out of the question. Ward himself admits that "the only kind of social assimilation that is increasingly fertile is that between races that occupy substantially the same social position. The case is very similar to that of sexual reproduction. For successful crossing the individuals must belong to the same species and not be too different."³³

Ward says further:

"There are some races whose culture differs so widely from that of others that they seem to form an exception to this law [of amalgamation]. They are theoretically but not practically assimilable."³⁴

³¹ *Pure Sociology*, 215 ff.; *Applied Sociology*, 108; *American Journal of Sociology*, VIII, 733.

³² The forces antagonizing the assimilating process are enumerated by Sarah E. Simon in the *American Journal of Sociology*, VI, 822.

³³ *Pure Sociology*, 215.

³⁴ Dealey and Ward, *Textbook of Sociology*, 213. Bryce points out the physical difficulties in the way of general amalgamation: "The mixture of whites and negroes, or of whites and Hindus, or of American aborigines and negroes, seldom shows good results. The hybrid stocks, if not inferior in physical strength to either of those whence they spring, are apparently less persistent, and might, so at least some observers hold, die out if they did not marry back into one or other of the parent races."—*Relations of the Advanced and the Backward Races of Mankind*, 24, 25.

One phase of extra-racial and extra-national assimilation is beyond controversy. Racial and geographical solidarity is already to a limited extent giving place to interracial and international class solidarity. Tolstoy says that the laboring classes of the great modern states are destitute of patriotism, that they have become indifferent to the state as such. Social classes will increasingly consolidate as the consciousness of common class interests grow more general. The socialist ideal of an international class-conscious industrial group is typical of what other classes may ultimately attain. The higher aristocracies of all countries already have this class-sense well developed, as royalty long has had.

A summary of the processes of contact and assimilation, so far as they relate to racial elements, yields certain principles which have some of the characteristics of established laws: (1) the law of isolation and hostility; (2) the law of inequality and stratification; (3) the law of superior attraction; (4) the law of attrition and accommodation; (5) the law of massing and numbers; (6) the law of diffusion and percolation; (7) the law of the standardization of cultures; (8) the law of the increasing fluidity of culture; (9) the law of persistence and survival.

The rough test and proof of race assimilation lies in the possibility of general and successful intermarriage.³⁵ Wherever orderly race-crossing becomes a settled practice it will be found that the types are so near to each other in both physical and cultural character that no serious problems arise from their blending. The offspring will no longer constitute a special class of half-breeds or mongrels, and there will be no clash of conflicting types, with resulting discredit to one or the other. Variation is now confined within limits which cause no rift in the social structure. On the physical side there is a normal degree of vigor and permanency, and on the cultural side there is an orthodox body of cultural interests equal or superior to those of either of the parent elements.

³⁵ The writer has discussed some of the social aspects of race-crossing in a paper on "Race and Marriage" in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January, 1910.